We're doing rational choice theory wrong. This is the claim that I will defend in this paper. We're doing rational choice theory wrong and if we do it right then we can irenically resolve some long-standing disagreements. * Thanks to
CEU (O) = Cr(E\O)U (E ∧ O) + Cr(M \O)U (M ∧ O)
= Cr(E) * 0 + Cr(M ) * 1, 000, 000 = CEU (T ) − 1000
As the CEU of two-boxing (T) is higher than the CEU of one-boxing (O), it follows that CDT will endorse the permissibility of just two-boxing.
So CDT, the causal perspective on rationality, endorses two-boxing. Now we can turn to the evidential perspective on rationality. To reach this, consider an argument for one-boxing: (1) if the agent two-boxes then she will have been predicted to two-box and so the opaque box will be empty (and so the agent will end up with just the $1000 from the transparent box);
(2) if the agent one-boxes then she will have been predicted to one-box and so the opaque box will contain $1,000,000 (and so the agent will end up with $1,000,000); (3) $1,000,000 is more than $1000; and therefore (4) the agent should one-box. This argument can lead to an evidential perspective on rationality, which is typically spelled out in the form of evidential decision theory (EDT). In informal terms this theory holds that a decision is rationally permissible if it provides the agent with evidence that is at least as desirable as the evidence that any other decision would provide. EDT sides with the above argument and endorses one-boxing in Newcomb's Problem, as one-boxing provides the desirable evidence that the agent was predicted to one-box and hence that the opaque box contains $1,000,000, whereas two-boxing provides the undesirable evidence that this box is empty.
Again, this point can be made formally. In particular, EDT labels a decision as permissible if it maximises evidential expected utility (EEU).
The EEU of a decision is calculated in the same way as its CEU, except that Cr(S\D) is replaced with the conditional credence Cr(S | D), which we can think of as capturing the evidence that D provides about S. So we calculate the EEU of a decision, D, as follows:
Cr(S | D)U (S ∧ D)
So EDT takes a decision to be permissible if it maximises a conditionalcredence-weighted sum of utilities. 
EEU (T ) = Cr(E | T )U (E ∧ T ) + Cr(M | T )U (M ∧ T ) = 1000

EEU (O) = Cr(E | O)U (E ∧ O) + Cr(M | O)U (M ∧ O)
= 1, 000, 000
As the EEU of one-boxing exceeds the EEU of two-boxing, EDT will endorse one-boxing. So according to EDT, the evidential perspective, one ought one-box in Newcomb's Problem. We have two perspectives on rationality and these perspectives part way on Newcomb's Problem.
Perspectival Pluralism
In the decades since Nozick introduced Newcomb's Problem to the philosophical community, there has been an ongoing debate about which of these perspectives is correct. However, Nozick (1993: 45) has spoken out against the assumption, tacit in this debate, that at least one of these perspectives must be rejected outright:
I suggest that we... say not merely that we are uncertain about which one of these two [perspectives] is (all by itself) correct, but that both of these [perspectives] are legitimate and each must be given its respective due.
Call this broad approach pluralism. That is, according to pluralism there are either: (a) unified norms of rational permissibility simpliciter, such that these norms refer to considerations from both the causal and evidential perspectives; or (b) distinct norms of causal rationality and evidential rationality (which are captured by the causal and evidential perspectives in turn). 5 An example of the first type of pluralism would be Nozick's own view, according to which a decision is permissible if it maximises a weighted sum of the CEU and the EEU. There is a clear sense in which this view takes permissibility to depend both on considerations captured by the causal perspective (the CEU) and considerations captured by the evidential perspective (the EEU). An example of the second type of pluralism would then be the view discussed in Horgan 1985: Horgan suggests that perhaps causal and evidential rationality are simply distinct normative domains and are not competing attempts to capture truths about the same normative domain.
Setting aside, for now, the distinction between these two types of accounts, one motivation for pluralism follows from the fact that both the argument for two-boxing and that for one-boxing are compelling; this is what 5 In this paper, I talk about rational permissibility rather than requirement. In doing so, I follow the treatment of indeterminacy and choice in various other discussions (cf. Dougherty 2014 and Rinard 2015) . In any case, given that an agent is required to φ just if she is both permitted to φ and not permitted to ¬φ, the discussion could easily be adapted so as to comment on rational requirement. makes Newcomb's Problem puzzling. One possible response to this fact is to accept pluralism: that is, accept that the two perspectives that follow from these arguments both play a role in an adequate account of rationality. 6
Nor is Newcomb's Problem the only case that supports pluralism. For example, consider the Psychopath Button (from Egan 2007):
Paul is faced with a button that, if pressed, will kill all of the psychopaths in the world. Paul must now choose between two options: he can either press the button or he can refrain from doing so. Now Paul strongly desires to live but he has a weak desire to rid the world of psychopaths. Further, while Paul is almost certain that he isn't a psychopath, he thinks that only a psychopath would be likely to press the button. Should Paul press the button?
As with Newcomb's Problem, there are two arguments here, to contradictory conclusions.
Egan points to one of these. In particular, Paul thinks that only a psychopath is likely to press the button and so thinks that if he himself presses the button, he is almost certainly a psychopath. If Paul is a psychopath and presses the button then he will cause his own death. Consequently, Paul pressessing the button provides evidence that he will almost certainly cause his own death. Under such circumstances, Paul should not press the button when he has the risk-free option of refraining from pressing.
The evidential perspective is responsive to this argument. After all, if Paul presses then this provides evidence that he's a psychopath and so evi-6 Both sides of the debate have responses to the argument that they reject (cf. Joyce 1999: 151-4; Ahmed 2014: 195-9) . However, insofar as the arguments are intuitively plausible, one might reject the responses rather than the original argument. It is surprising that more people haven't chosen tollens over ponens here.
dence that he will die. On the other hand, if Paul refrains from pressing, this provides evidence that no-one will die and so that Paul himself will survive.
As the second lot of evidence is more welcome for the agent than the first, the evidential perspective will endorse refraining from pressing. 7
Now, while many people find the argument for refraining compelling, some do not. Further, there is in fact another argument available here. After all, Paul is almost certain that he isn't a psychopath. If Paul isn't a psychopath then he receives his most desired outcome by pressing the button and receives a less desired outcome if he refrains from pressing the button.
So Paul is rationally required to press the button. 8
The causal perspective is responsive to this argument. After all, Paul is almost certain that he's not a psychopath and so almost certain that pressing will cause all psychopaths to die but will not cause his own death. On the other hand, refraining will not cause any deaths. Insofar as Paul wants to kill all psychopaths, the expected causal impact of pressing is then better than the expected causal impact of not pressing. Consequently, the causal perspective will label pressing as rationally required. 9 So, as in Newcomb's Problem, in the Psychopath Button there are compelling arguments to contradictory conclusions. Then, once again, a natural response is to accept that both the causal and the evidential perspectives play a role in an adequate account of rational choice. After all, the evidential perspective is responsive to one of the plausible arguments in the Psychopath Button and the causal perspective is responsive to the other. Given this, we can make sense of both arguments by accepting that both perspectives play 7 More formally, this result follows from EDT because Cr(Psychopath | Press) is high. 8 It is stipulated in the Psychopath Button that an appropriately small risk of death can be outweighed by the higher chance of successfully killing all psychopaths. More formally, this result follows from CDT because Cr(Psychopath\Press) = Cr(Psychopath) and, as specified, this credence is low.
9 For a more formal discussion, see Egan 2007: 99-100. a role in our best account of rational choice and so can make sense of both of these arguments by accepting pluralism (further, I will argue in §5 that pluralism can also account for why the first of the above arguments might strike us as more compelling than the second). So, along with Newcomb's Problem, the Psychopath Button supports pluralism. Consequently, we have two initial reasons to accept pluralism. In the remainder of the paper, I will discuss further reasons to do so, in the course of discussing a particular form of pluralism: indeterminacy pluralism.
Indeterminate Rationality
Pluralism can come in many flavours. This raises the question of which form of pluralism we should accept. Well, here it's natural to start with Nozick, my paradigm pluralist, whose account I outlined earlier. According to this account, a decision is permissible if it maximises a weighted sum of the CEU and EEU. Now the full details of this account will not matter for my purposes.
Here's what does matter: Nozick accepts a view on which there are unified, overarching norms of rationality. Nozick's view is then pluralist insofar as he holds that these unified norms make reference to considerations from both the causal and the evidential perspectives. This is the first of the two types of pluralism that I mentioned earlier.
However, assuming that we are motivated to accept pluralism in part by reflection on Newcomb's Problem and the Psychopath Button, this sort of hybrid view is problematic. After all, we can now ask what the overarching norms of rational permissibility simpliciter entail about rational permissibility in any particular version of these cases. Take Newcomb's Problem. Here there are three options. First, these norms might entail the permissibility of just two-boxing. However, the view then fails to be appropriately re-sponsive to the earlier argument for one-boxing. Second, these norms might entail the permissibility of just one-boxing. However, the view then fails to be appropriately responsive to the earlier argument for two-boxing. Third, the norms might entail the permissibility of both decisions. However, the view then fails to be appropriately responsive to either the argument for one-boxing or the argument for two-boxing. After all, these arguments establish not just that one decision is rational but also that the other is not.
Given this, taking both decisions to be permissible is in conflict with both arguments. Consequently, any account that spells out pluralism in terms of unified, overarching norms of rationality will struggle to account for both arguments in Newcomb's Problem. Assuming that accounting for these is one of our motivations for accepting pluralism, we have grounds to reject such a version of pluralism. 10
It is time to turn, then, to an alternative type of pluralism. To get to such a view, I start with a comment made by Horgan (1985: 229 In other words, Horgan is a pluralist not in the sense that he takes the causal and evidential perspectives to both play a role in norms of rational permissibility simpliciter but in the sense that he accepts the existence of distinct norms of causal rationality and norms of evidential rationality. 11
This was the second type of pluralism that I mentioned above.
This raises a further question: if there are merely norms of causal rationality and of evidential rationality then what should we say about talk of rational permissibility simpliciter? Here's an attractive view: our concept of rational permissibility admits of indeterminacy, with the evidential perspective (EDT) corresponding to one sharpening of this concept and the causal perspective (CDT) corresponding to another. 12 Now, the full details of this view will depend on the account of indeterminacy adopted. However, for concreteness I will focus here on the view that we are led to if we adopt supervaluationism regarding indeterminacy. 13 Consequently, on the view under consideration: (a) a decision is rationally permissible simpliciter if and only if it is rationally permissible from both the causal and evidential perspectives (that is, according to both CDT and EDT); (b) a decision is rationally impermissible simpliciter if and only if it is rationally impermissible on both the causal and evidential perspectives (again, according to both EDT and CDT); and (c) a decision is indeterminately permissible if and only if it is permissible on one perspective and impermissible on the other (so if it is permissible according to one of EDT and CDT and impermissible according to the other). 14 In the remainder of this paper, I will argue for rational permissibility simpliciter but that they fall silent in a small number of cases. In these cases, the overall notion will not apply and instead we can apply only the notions of the evidentially and the causally rational. 12 Here, I assume that we do have a single concept of (instrumental) rational permissibility. This claim strikes me as intuitively plausible. Further, proponents of EDT and CDT do typically take it that they are attempting to provide an account of the same sort of means-end rationality. Then, on top of all of this, EDT and CDT come apart only in strange cases that were not encountered in the development of our concepts. As such, it is unlikely that we will have distinct concepts to pick out these two classes of norms (given that they overlap in the cases that shaped our conceptual world).
13 I will assume that indeterminacy occurs at the semantic level rather than in the world itself. Alternatives to supervaluationism include epistemicism and subvaluationism and which account one adopts here will likely depend on their broader views about indeterminacy. I find supervaluationism generally plausible and so focus on this account here.
14 Might there be other sharpenings of permissibility? I return to this question later. However, I note that if indeterminacy pluralism is to be plausible then any other sharpen-this indeterminacy pluralism. 15
Four Arguments
In order to do so, I will provide four arguments for this view.
Indeterminacy Worries
As a starting point, then, I note that some people might be suspicious from the get go about the idea of indeterminate permissibility. 16 Consequently, it's worth starting out by deflating this suspicion.
In order to do so, I note that there are various reasons, independent of the considerations in this paper, to take the possibility of indeterminate permissibility seriously. For example, Williams (2014; 2016) has argued that there are some cases where it is indeterminate whether we will receive the things that we care about (perhaps because it is indeterminate whether we will be the person that receives these things) and has suggested that indeterminate permissibility might arise in such cases. Similarly, Rinard (2015) has suggested that cases involving imprecise credences are cases where a person has indeterminate beliefs and has suggested that indeterminate permissibilings will need to coincidence with EDT and CDT in everyday cases, where it is implausible to declare that some decision is indeterminately permissible. Why think that this will turn out to be the case? The basic idea, which I will discuss further in §4.2, is that reflection on the factors that shape our concepts suggests that indeterminacy will only arise in strange cases here.
15 Alternatively, perhaps 'rational permissibility' is ambiguous. Despite some apparent differences, I think there is little to separate the ambiguity and indeterminacy views, so discuss indeterminacy for concreteness but remain open to both views.
16 It might be worried that an evaluation of a decision as indeterminately permissible cannot guide us. However, it's not clear that this is true (cf. Williams 2014). Further, even if it is, the indeterminacy theory can guide us when decisions are determinately permissible and can play useful non-guidance roles (like providing insight into the normative world).
Another concern: does permissibility lacks the features of paradigm examples of vagueness (like baldness and redness)? Perhaps but it is similar to another such case: the vagueness of counterfactual dependence. Further, indeterminacy extends beyond vagueness (see Williams 2012 ) and so indeterminacy pluralism need not be about vagueness at all. ity naturally arises here. Finally, Schoenfield (2015) and Dougherty (2014) , among others, have suggested that moral permissibility can be indeterminate. For example, Dougherty considers that it might be morally permissible to save your friend rather than, say, two strangers, morally impermissible to save your friend rather than, say, 1000 strangers and has suggested that there might be some number of strangers in between where it is indeterminately permissible to save your friend rather than the strangers. In the light of this, it is plausible that rational permissibility too might sometimes be indeterminate.
We already have good reasons, then, to think that rational permissibility can be indeterminate. Consequently, the mere fact that the theory under consideration involves indeterminate permissibility is no mark against it. 17
Semantic Considerations
Following on from this, it's worth saying something to motivate the specific indeterminacy theory under discussion. Note, then, that indeterminacy pluralism denies that there are any norms of rational permissibility simpliciter (or, at least, denies that these norms must always give unequivocal guidance). What this theory explains, then, is our talk of such permissibility.
Consequently, the sort of indeterminacy under discussion here is semantic indeterminacy, where such indeterminacy arises when the conventions that govern our language don't settle some case. Now, as noted in Horwich 1985, these conventions evolve so as to be useful in our actual environment and so it's entirely plausible that these conventions will not settle strange cases like Newcomb's Problem. Consequently, Horwich notes, EDT and CDT (which agree in most everyday cases) will 17 Nor does the literature on indeterminate permissibility undermine the novelty of the current discussion (which outlines a new source of indeterminacy of permissibility).
plausibly do an equally good job of capturing the settled conventions about rational permissibility. 18 As such, it is natural to think that permissibility might sometimes be indeterminate and that the evidential and causal perspectives might correspond to different ways of resolving this indeterminacy. We have initial grounds, then, to be sympathetic to the indeterminacy theory.
The Indeterminacy of Counterfactuals
More speculatively, it can be argued that the indeterminacy theory follows Taking this argument slowly, start with Lewis's (1973) account of counterfactuals. In simplified terms, this account holds that a counterfactual is true if its consequent holds in the possible world where the antecedent holds that is most similar to the actual world. Now similarity is indeterminate: one world might be more similar to the actual world in terms of its laws of nature while another might be more similar in terms of its past history and there doesn't seem to be a determinate answer as to which of these worlds is overall more similar to the actual world. Now, as similarity is indeterminate and counterfactuals hold based on similarity considerations, it is at least sometimes indeterminate whether a counterfactual holds. Now, we can recognise the importance of counterfactuals to choice by framing decision theory not in terms of conditional or causal credences but in terms of counterfactual credences. So, on this view, decision theory appeals to the agent's credences that if she were to choose D, S would be the case. A decision is then permissible if it maximises counterfactual expected utility. Now this theory's guidance depends on how we resolved the indeterminacy of counterfactual dependence: different guidance will result from different resolutions. Consequently, if we don't insist on using a single resolution of this indeterminacy in decision theory, decisions will sometimes be indeterminately permissible.
But will CDT and EDT correspond to sharpenings of permissibility, as per indeterminacy pluralism? Well, they will if each results from counterfactual decision theory by resolving counterfactual indeterminacy in some manner. And indeed, CDT is often presented as counterfactual decision theory, with a non-backtracking resolution of counterfactual indeterminacy (roughly, a resolution that insists on sameness of past). 20 Further, per Horgan (1981: 345-7) , EDT too can be construed in this manner, but with a conditionalised resolution of indeterminacy. So CDT and EDT will naturally correspond to sharpenings of the indeterminate notion of permissibility.
Still, this hardly provides a watertight argument for indeterminacy pluralism. After all, while counterfactuals plausibly play a role in rational choice, it could be insisted that we must resolve all counterfactual indeterminacy to make sense of this role. If so, indeterminate permissibility will not arise. 21 So if it doesn't provide a watertight argument, what does the 20 I set aside here a complication involving chancy cases. See Lewis 1981. 21 Alternatively, someone could adopt the extreme position that all resolutions of coun-above discussion establish? It establishes a natural way that indeterminate permissibility can arise and shows how we can formalise indeterminacy pluralism. This is far from a decisive argument for the view. Nevertheless, it complements the other arguments discussed.
Resolving the Problem Cases
Finally, the plausibility of indeterminacy pluralism is bolstered by the fact that this theory can make sense of both of the scenarios discussed in the previous section. The solution in both cases will be basically the same. After all, in Newcomb's Problem the intuitions and arguments favouring one-boxing and two-boxing are both taken seriously by indeterminacy pluralism because each intuition and associated argument gets things right on one sharpening of the notion of rational permissibility. Then we can make the same move in relation to the Psychopath Button: the intuition favouring pressing is captured by one sharpening of permissibility and the intuition favour refraining is captured by another. Consequently, indeterminacy pluralism can make sense of both Newcomb's Problem and the Psychopath Button. There are four reasons, then, to accepting indeterminacy pluralism.
Psychopaths and Context
Still, at this point a problem arises for indeterminacy pluralism. After all, many people find the argument for refraining in the Psychopath Button far more compelling than the argument for pressing the button in this scenario.
Consequently, these people conclude that an agent is straightforwardly reterfactual indeterminacy play a role in rational choice. However, on such an account it is likely that most decisions will be indeterminately permissible. As such, I take this account to be implausible given the view, in §4.2, of the sort of indeterminacy under discussion here.
quired to refrain from pressing the button here. This raises two challenges to indeterminacy pluralism. First, this theory needs to be able to account for why the argument for refraining has greater intuitive force than the argument for pressing, given that indeterminacy pluralism entails that each of these arguments are right on one sharpening of permissibility. Second, the proponent of this theory needs to be able to explain away the intuition that refraining is straightforwardly rationally required, given that indeterminacy pluralism instead entails that this decision is indeterminately permissible. 22
Fortunately, a simple response to both challenges is available. In particular, it is plausible that contextual factors help determine which sharpenings of permissibility are psychologically salient in some circumstance. 23 Further, if contextual factors make the evidential perspective more psychologically salient than the causal perspective in the Psychopath Button then this would explain why people tend to find the argument for refraining more compelling than the argument for pressing and, as a result of this, would explain why people (mistakenly) take refraining to be determinately rationally required.
What contextual factors might play the desired role? Well, for a start, the stakes (that is, the difference in expected value between the two available decisions) in the Psychopath Button are higher on the evidential perspective than on the causal perspective (which is to say that there is a greater gap between the EEU of pressing and of refraining than between the CEU of pressing and of refraining). After all, on the evidential perspective pressing is very bad, because pressing kills Paul. On the other hand, on the causal perspective pressing is a far weaker good, as it is merely likely to rid the 22 A number of philosophers deny the force of the intuition that refraining is rationally required (cf. Arntzenius 2008; Joyce 2012). So one might well doubt that this objection is as forceful as I have taken it to be.
23 That is, I am arguing that context helps determine our intuitive judgements. An alternative view: perhaps rational permissibility itself has contextual parameters that sometimes pick out just one sharpening.
world of psychopaths. 24 So the stakes are higher on the evidential perspective than on the causal perspective. Further, stakes are key contextual factors that plausibly inform our intuitive judgements and so make the evidential perspective psychologically more salient here. 25 In addition to this, moral consideration plausibly influence our intuitive judgements about rationality. 26 That is, we are plausibly more likely to judge a decision as rational if it is moral and more likely to judge it as irrational if it is immoral. Now insofar as pressing involves mass murder and so is morally bad, we're likely to be psychologically more responsive to arguments that label pressing as irrational. Consequently, this factor too will make the evidential perspective psychologically more compelling than the causal perspective in the case at hand.
By reference to these factors, indeterminacy pluralism can account for the greater intuitive force of the argument for refraining than the argument for pressing in the Psychopath Button: contextual factors are present in the Psychopath Button that make the evidential perspective (and hence the argument for refraining) more psychologically salient than the causal perspective (and hence the argument for pressing). Consequently, not only can indeterminacy pluralism capture the sense in which there are two compelling arguments in the Psychopath Button but it can also make sense of why one of these arguments exerts greater intuitive weight than the other. 24 The case stipulates that Paul values survival over ridding the world of psychopaths. 25 For evidence that stakes inform our decision-theoretic intuitions, see MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979: 393) and Anand (1990) . For previous discussions that have relied on the assumption of such stake sensitivity, see Nozick 1993 and MacAskill 2016. 26 For evidence that our intuitions generally (about, for example, causation and intentionality) are influenced by moral factors see Knobe 2003; Knobe and Fraser 2008. In Newcomb's Problem, there is significant disagreement about which decision it would be rational to make. However, in the Smoking Lesion there is almost unanimous agreement that Cathy ought to smoke. After all, she enjoys smoking and smoking doesn't increase her cancer risk. In the light of this, Cathy may as well get the pleasure of smoking, given that doing so doesn't come with any disadvantage. Now this decision is permissible from the causal perspective: smoking doesn't cause Cathy to be more likely to get cancer but it does cause her some enjoyment and so smoking has a better causal impact than not smoking, which doesn't cause the same enjoyment. 28 On the other hand, at least on the face of it, not smoking is labelled as rationally required on the evidential perspective: smoking provides Cathy with evidence that she has the lesion, and so is more likely to get cancer, while not smoking provides Cathy with evidence that she lacks the lesion, and so is less likely to get cancer. Not 27 This case has been discussed for decades but my presentation follows Egan 2007. 28 See Briggs (2010: 7-8) for formal details.
smoking provides better evidence than smoking, so not smoking is rationally required on the evidential perspective. 29
As a consequence of this a problem arises. After all, not smoking appears to be outright impermissible here but indeterminacy pluralism instead takes this decision to be indeterminately permissible, as this decision is permissible on one sharpening of permissibility (the evidential perspective) but not the other (the causal perspective). Consequently, indeterminacy pluralism seems to get this case wrong and so we have a challenge to this theory.
Here there are two possible responses. The first appeals to existing defences of EDT, which attempt to show either that this theory does not endorse smoking in the Smoking Lesion or that it endorses smoking only in strange versions of the case where our intuitions are no longer reliable.
Such defences come in a number of forms but one of the simplest, and most prominent, is the tickle defence (for a more detailed defence of EDT here, see Ahmed 2014) . According to the tickle defence, in realistic versions of the Smoking Lesion, the lesion will influence Cathy's decision by influencing her beliefs or her desires (at least in versions of the case where Cathy can be said to still be deciding freely). Further, it is argued that Cathy will typically be able to detect this influence (that is, Cathy will feel some sort of tickle if she has the lesion). If so, however, then she will already know whether or not she has the smoking lesion, from reflection on whether or not she feels the tickle. As such, smoking will not provide further evidence that she has the lesion. Then, as deciding to smoke still provides her with evidence that she will get the pleasure of smoking, this decision will now provide the most desirable evidence. So the tickle defence concludes that EDT endorses the requirement to smoke in the Smoking Lesion. Now, if one accepts this argument outright then the problem considered in this section is resolved, as indeterminacy pluralism now labels smoking as determinately permissible. Still, even if one doubts that the tickle defence always does the desired job, it must be accepted that it often does. So, at worst, the evidential perspective endorses not smoking only in versions of the Smoking Lesion where tickles do not arise. Further, many such cases will either be unrealistic or will involve Cathy's free will being impinged upon.
Consequently, the indeterminacy pluralist can now bite the bullet at little cost: they only need to accept the indeterminate permissibility of smoking in a constrained class of cases, many of which will be unrealistic.
Still, another response is also available. After all, a second option would be to reject the claim that the evidential perspective corresponds to a sharpening of the indeterminate notion of permissibility and instead accept a version of indeterminacy pluralism on which one sharpening corresponds to the causal perspective and another sharpening corresponds to some distinct perspective (that is, a perspective that is neither the causal nor the evidential perspective). 
Conclusions
In this paper, I have defended three main claims. First, we should accept pluralism. That is, we should accept that both the causal and evidential perspectives play a role in an adequate account of rational choice. Second, we should accept indeterminacy pluralism. That is, we should spell out pluralism by accepting that our concept of rational permissibility admits of indeterminacy and that the evidential and causal perspectives correspond to different sharpenings of this concept. Finally, we should supplement indeterminacy pluralism by an appeal to the context-sensitivity of our intuitions, to explain why our intuitions sometimes hew particularly close to either the causal or evidential perspective.
Further, as well as establishing these three claims, the discussion in this paper provides a lens through which the broader debate over Newcomb's Problem can be viewed. In particular, this debate once focused almost exclusively on EDT and CDT but recent years have seen an explosion in the number of interesting decision-theoretic views being defended. (2012) defends a view on which CDT and EDT turn out to be one and the same theory, when appropriately construed. Finally, Briggs (2010) has developed an impossibility proof, which uses both causal and evidential principles to attempt to demonstrate that no adequate theory of rational choice can be developed.
At the moment, all of these results, and a number of others, have been presented as disparate competitors and, as a result, the decision theoretic debate has lost the clarity it once had, with possible options multiplying.
However, pluralism can bring some coherence back into this debate, as pluralist intuitions underpin all of this recent work. Consequently, focus on pluralism reveals not a disparate mess of views but rather reveals that a new movement in decision theory has developed in recent years and that it is gaining pace.
In light of all of the above, I conclude: by ignoring pluralism, we're doing rational choice theory wrong; we're doing rational choice theory wrong and to do it right we need to take seriously both the causal and the evidential perspectives. This paper, then, is a call to the decision-theoretic barricades and on our uniforms engraved these words: 'decision theory', and below, 'plurality, indeterminacy, contextuality'.
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